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Just a Paradigm:  Evidence-Based Medicine Meets Philosophy of Science

1.	Introduction
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM)​[1]​ is the application of findings of clinical epidemiology to the practice of medicine.  It developed from the work of clinical epidemiologists at McMaster University and Oxford University in the 1970s and 1980s and self-consciously presented itself as a “new paradigm” called “evidence-based medicine” in the early 1990s (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group 1992, 2420-2425).  It was embraced in Canada and the UK in the 1990s, and adopted in many other countries, both developed and developing (Daly 2005).  The techniques of population based studies and systematic review have produced an extensive and powerful body of research.  A canonical and helpful definition of EBM​[2]​ is that of Davidoff et. al. (Davidoff et al. 1995, 1085-1086) in an editorial in the British Medical Journal:
“In essence, evidence based medicine is rooted in five linked ideas: firstly, clinical decisions should be based on the best available scientific evidence; secondly, the clinical problem - rather than habits or protocols - should determine the type of evidence to be sought; thirdly, identifying the best evidence means using epidemiological and biostatistical ways of thinking; fourthly, conclusions derived from identifying and critically appraising evidence are useful only if put into action in managing patients or making health care decisions; and, finally, performance should be constantly evaluated.”
EBM regards its own epistemic techniques as privileged over other more traditional methods such as clinical experience, expert opinion, and physiological reasoning.  The more traditional techniques are viewed as more fallible, and recommended only when EBM is absent.  There is not one new technique, but several.  The following are typically regarded as part of EBM:
1.	Rigorous design of clinical trials, especially the randomized controlled trial (RCT).  The RCT is to be used wherever physically and ethically feasible.
2.	Systematic evidence review and meta-analysis, including grading of the evidence in “evidence hierarchies.”
3.	Outcome measures (leading to suggestions for improvement)
The RCT has often been described as the “gold standard” of evidence for effectiveness of medical interventions.  It is a powerful technique, originally developed by the geneticist R.A. Fisher and applied for the first time in a medical context by A. Bradford Hill’s 1948 evaluation of streptomycin for tuberculosis (Doll, Peto, and Clarke 1999, 367-368).  
EBM also includes systematic and formal techniques for combining the results of different clinical trials.  A systematic review does a thorough search of the literature and an evaluation and grading of trials.  An evidence hierarchy is typically used to structure the judgments of quality.  Meta-analysis integrates the actual data from different but similar high-quality trials to give an overall single statistical result.
Often, EBM is supplemented with formal techniques from Medical Decision Making (MDM) such as risk/benefit calculations.  The risk/benefit calculations can be made for individual patients, making use of patient judgments of utility, or they can be made in the context of health care economics, for populations.  MDM seeks to avoid common errors of judgment, such as availability and salience biases, in medical decision making.​[3]​
The overall project is to use the techniques of EBM (and sometimes also MDM) to construct practice guidelines and to take care of individual patients.  Each technique—the RCT, other high quality clinical trials, meta-analysis and systematic review--is based on its own core technical successes.  The techniques fit together, and share a reliance on statistics, probability theory and utility theory.  Journals, centers, clearinghouses, networks educational programs, textbooks, committees and governments all produce and disseminate EBM.
EBM rose to dominance right after the prominence of consensus conferences for assessment of complex and sometimes conflicting evidence.  As late as 1990, an Institute of Medicine report evaluating the international uses of medical consensus conferences said “Group judgment methods are perhaps the most widely used means of assessment of medical technologies in many countries” (Baratz, Goodman, and Council on Health Care Technology 1990).  Just a few years later, expert consensus is viewed in the same medical circles as the lowest level of evidence, when it is included in the evidence at all.   For example, the Canadian Task force on Preventive Health Care which began in 1979 as a consensus conference program now explicitly declares “Evidence takes precedence over consensus” (Canadian Task Force on Preventive Health Care).
EBM has not completely replaced group judgment, however.  Consensus conferences (or something similar) are often still used for producing evidence-based guidelines or policy, that is, for translating a systematic review into a practical recommendation.  (This continued usage is discussed in the chapter on consensus conferences.)
There is some indication that EBM is now past its peak, and being overshadowed in part by a new approach, that of “translational medicine.”  Considerable resources from the NIH, from the European Commission and from the National Institute for Health Research in the UK have been redirected to “bench to bedside and back” research, which is typically the research that takes place before the clinical trials that are core to EBM.  Donald Berwick, the founder of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (which is the leading organization for quality improvement in healthcare), now claims that “we have overshot the mark” with EBM and created an “intellectual hegemony” that excludes important research methods from recognition (Berwick 2005, 315-315-316).  Berwick calls the overlooked methods “pragmatic science” and sees them as crucial for scientific discovery.  He mentions the same sorts of approaches (use of local knowledge, exploration of hypotheses) that “translational medicine” advocates describe.  After the discussions in this chapter, some reasons for the recent turn to translational medicine will become clearer.
	There is a vast literature on evidence-based medicine, most consisting of systematic evidence reviews for particular health care questions.  A substantial portion of the literature, however, is a critical engagement with EBM as a whole, pointing out both difficulties and limitations.  These discussions come from outsiders as well as insiders to the field of EBM.  My goal in this chapter is to do something like a systematic review of this literature, discerning the kinds of criticisms that seem cogent.  EBM, like all the methodologies in medicine that I examine, has both core strengths and limitations.  I will begin with an overview of some general social and philosophical characteristics of EBM, and then turn to the criticisms.

2.  EBM as a “Kuhnian paradigm”
	When the Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group described themselves as having a “new paradigm” of medical knowledge (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group 1992, 2420-2425), they particularly had in mind Kuhn’s (1962) characterization of a paradigm as setting the standards for what is to count as admissible evidence.​[4]​  EBM assessments make use of an “evidence hierarchy” (often called “levels of evidence”) in which higher levels of evidence are regarded as of higher quality than lower levels of evidence.  A typical evidence hierarchy​[5]​ puts double-masked (or “double-blinded”) RCTs at the top, or perhaps right after meta-analyses or systematic reviews of RCTs.  Unmasked RCTs come next, followed by well designed case controlled or cohort studies and then observational studies.  Expert opinion, expert consensus, clinical experience and physiological rationale are at the bottom.  The rationale for the evidence hierarchy is that higher levels of evidence are thought to avoid biases that are present in the lower levels of evidence.  Specifically, randomization avoids selection bias (but see (Worrall 2007, 451-451-488)) and masking helps to distinguish real from placebo effects (but see (Howick 2008)).  Powering the trial with sufficient numbers of participants and using statistical tools avoids the salience and availability biases that can skew informal assessments and limited clinical experience.
	The language of Kuhnian paradigms has been overused and become somewhat clichéd.  Yet EBM—more than the other new methodologies of medicine that I discuss in this book—has many characteristics of a traditional Kuhnian paradigm​[6]​, having all three of the characteristics of a Kuhnian paradigm discerned by Margaret Masterman (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970) and agreed to by Kuhn (Kuhn, Conant, and Haugeland 2000).  First, EBM is a social movement with associated institutions such as Evidence-Based Practice Centers, official collaborations, textbooks, courses and journals.  It is also, secondly, a general philosophy of medicine, defining both the questions of interest and the appropriate evidence.  It is seen as the central methodology of medicine by its practitioners and as an unwelcome dominant movement by its detractors.  But third, and more uniquely, it is characterized by a core of technical results and successful exemplars that have been extended over time.   
Kuhn referred to this kind of case as “concrete puzzle solutions…employed as models or examples” (Kuhn 1970) and later as a “disciplinary matrix” including “symbolic generalization, models and exemplars” (Kuhn 1977).   He regards this as the original and fundamental meaning of the term “paradigm” (Kuhn 1977). 
Contrary to appearances and self-presentation, this core is not produced by a general algorithm or set of precise methodological rules.  One of the things that Kuhn emphasized about paradigms is that they are driven primarily by exemplars, and not by rules.  He writes (Kuhn 1970) that exemplars are “one sort of element…the concrete puzzle-solutions employed as exemplars which can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science.  Kuhn argued that this is significant because the rules are not the basis for the development of the science.  Rather, Kuhn argues, less precise judgments about similarity of examples are used (Kuhn 1977).
The medical RCT traces its beginning to A. Bradford Hill’s 1948 evaluation of streptomycin for tuberculosis (Doll, Peto, and Clarke 1999, 367-368).  It was initially resisted by many physicians used to treating each patient individually, therapeutically and with confidence in treatment choice (Marks 1997).  Nevertheless, important trials such as the polio vaccine field trial of 1954 (which was also double-masked) and the 1955 evaluation of treatments for rheumatic fever helped bring the RCT into routine use (Meldrum 1998, 1233-1233-6; Meldrum 2000, 745-745-760).   In 1970 the RCT achieved official status in the USA with inclusion in the new FDA requirements for pharmaceutical testing (Meldrum 2000, 745-745-760).  Some of the most well-known early successful uses of RCTs were the 1960s-1970s NCI randomized controlled trial of lumpectomy versus mastectomy for early stage breast cancer and the 1980s international study of aspirin and streptokinase for the prevention of myocardial infarction.  However, not all early use of the RCT was straightforward; the attempt to conduct a Diet-Heart study in the 1960s was hampered and finally frustrated by the difficulties in implementing a masked trial of diet (Marks 1997).  The methodology of the RCT does not readily apply to all the situations in which we might wish to use it.  As Kuhn might put it, normal science is not a matter of simple repetition of the paradigm case; it requires minor or major tinkering, and sometimes ends in frustration (or what Kuhn would call an “anomaly”).  There are also variations in the design of RCTs.  For example, some trials are “intention to treat,” in which no experimental subjects are dropped from the trial, even if they fail to go through the course of treatment, and some trials include only those experimental subjects who do not drop out.  Some trails have a placebo in the control arm and some trials have an established treatment in the control arm.  It is often said that designing and evaluation of an RCT requires “judgment” (see for example (Rawlins 20082359)); by this I infer that what is meant is that trials cannot be designed by a universal set of rules and trials require domain expertise, not only statistical expertise. 
The same insights apply to systematic reviews and meta-analyses.  The first systematic review is often identified as the Oxford Database of Perinatal Trials 1989 study of corticosteroids for fetal lung development; this study was the basis for the development of the Cochrane Collaboration in 1993 which has since then done over 3000 systematic reviews.  Other organizations producing systematic reviews include the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ) and its fourteen Evidence-Based Practice Centers and the American College of Physicians (ACP) Journal Club.  All systematic reviews use evidence hierarchies, but there is some variation in the hierarchies in use.  The RCT is always at the top or just below meta-analyses of RCTs, but there are variations in where other kinds of studies are ranked, and in whether or not animal trials, basic science and expert opinion are included.  Systematic review also assess the quality (not just the hierachical rank) of trials, usually in terms of how well they handle withdrawals and how well they are randomized and masked.  In 2002 the AHRQ reported forty systems of rating in use, six of them within its own network of evidence-based practice centers (AHRQ 2002).   The GRADE Working Group, established in 2000, is attempting to reach consensus on one system of rating the quality and strength of evidence.  This is an ironic development, given that EBM intends to replace group judgment methods!
Meta-analysis requires judgments about the similarity of trials for combination and the quality of evidence in each trial, as well as about the possibility of systematic bias in the evidence overall, for example due to publication bias and pharmaceutical company support.  Meta-analysis is a formal technique, but not an algorithmic one: judgments need to be made about trial quality (as with systematic reviews, use of an evidence hierarchy is part of the process) and similarity of trial endpoints or other aspects of studies.    Different meta-analyses of the same data have produced different conclusions (Juni et al. 1999, 1054-1060; Yank, Rennie, and Bero 2007, 1202-1205).  
The identification of EBM with a Kuhnian paradigm should not be taken too scrupulously.  Exemplars and judgments of similarity are important, but rules also play a role.  Kuhnian claims about incommensurability between paradigms and the social constitution of objectivity are controversial here and would certainly be denied by practitioners of EBM.​[7]​  We have moved on from Kuhn’s ideas, revolutionary in the 1960s, but now built upon and transformed in more sophisticated ways.

3.  Critical discussions of EBM
Critical discussions of EBM have tended to focus on the procedural soundness of the technical apparatus (the RCT and/or meta-analysis and systematic review), the effectiveness of EBM in practice, or on EBM’s explicit or implicit claims to be a general philosophy of medicine.  I’ll examine these three areas in turn.

A.	Criticisms of procedural aspects of EBM
	Many of the criticisms of EBM procedures have come from British philosophers of science associated with the London School of Economics.  Their main approach is to argue that the “gold standard” (the RCT) is neither necessary nor sufficient for clinical research.  They argue that RCTs do not always control for the biases they are intended to control, they do not produce reliably generalizable knowledge, or they can be unnecessary constraints on clinical testing.  These arguments are theoretical and abstract in character, although they are sometimes illustrated by examples.  I distinguish them from arguments that RCTs have difficulties in practice, that is, from evaluation of RCTs based on the actual outcomes of such studies.
John Worrall (2002, 316-330; 2007b, 451-451-488; 2007a, 981-981-1022) argues that randomization is just one way, and an imperfect way, of controlling for confounding factors that might produce selection bias.  The problem is that randomization can control for only a few confounding factors; when there are indefinitely many factors, both known and unknown, that may lead to bias, chances are that any one randomization will not eliminate all these factors.  Under these circumstances, chances are that any particular clinical trial will have at least one kind of selection bias, just by accident.  The only way to avoid this is to re-randomize and do another clinical trial, which may, again by chance, eliminate the first trial’s selection bias but introduce another.  Worrall concludes that the RCT does not yield reliable results unless it is repeated time and again, re-randomizing each time, and the results are aggregated and analyzed overall.  This is practically speaking impossible.  In context, Worrall is less worried about the reliability of RCTs than he is about the assumption that they are much more reliable—in a different epistemic class—than e.g. well-designed observational (“historically controlled”) studies.  He is arguing that the RCT should be taken off its pedestal and that all trials can have selection bias.
Nancy Cartwright (2007a, 11-11-20; Cartwright 2007b; Cartwright 2009, 127-127-136) points out that RCTs may have internal validity, but their external validity and hence their applicability to real world questions is dependent on the representativeness of the test population.  For example, she cites the failure of the California class-size reduction program, which was based on the success of a RCT in Tennessee, as due to failure of external validity(Cartwright 2009, 127-127-136).  She does not give a medical example of actual failure of external validity, although she gives one of possible failure: prophylactic antibiotic treatment of children with HIV in developing countries.  UNAIDS and UNICEF 2005 treatment recommendations were based on the results of a 2004 RCT in Zaire.  Cartwright is concerned that the Zaire results will not generalize to resource-poor settings across other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Cartwright 2007b)  This kind of concern is not new and there are medical examples of lack of external validity.  For example, some recommendations for heart disease, developed in trials of men only, do not apply to women.  There is a history of challenges to RCTs on the grounds that they have excluded certain groups from participation (e.g. women, the elderly, children) yet are used for general health recommendations.  The exclusions are made on epistemic and/or ethical grounds.  These days, women are less likely to be excluded because the NIH and other granting organizations require their participation in almost all clinical trials, but other exclusions remain.  Cartwright expresses the concern about external validity in its most general form.
Jeremy Howick (Howick 2008) argues that masking is not useful outside of contexts in which outcomes are measured subjectively and that masking is both impossible and unnecessary when dealing with large effect size.  It is impossible when dealing with large effect size because the effect of the drug unmasks the assignment.  He also argues that masking is in practice inadequate for placebo controlled trials, since participants can usually tell through the presence of side effects whether or not they are receiving an active intervention.
	These are significant criticisms, although I think that their import needs to be carefully assessed.  Randomization is unlikely to control for selection bias only in the event that there are many unrelated and unknown population variables that influence outcome, because only in that complex case is one of those variables likely to be accidentally unbalanced by the randomization.  Worrall considers only the abstract possibility of multiple unknown variables; he does not consider the likely relationship (correlation) of those variables with one another and he does not give us reason to think that, in practice, randomization generally (rather than very rarely) leaves some population variables in place to bias the outcome.
RCTs in medicine generally have more external validity than the RCTs in education that Cartwright uses to show lack of external validity.  Also, we typically know, from some of the trial selection criteria, where the controversies about generalization lie.  This does not mean that we can figure out the domain of application of trial results in a simple and formulaic manner.  Domain expertise is essential for projection, as of course Nelson Goodman argued long ago (Goodman 1955).
Howick is correct that masking important only for small effects with subjectively measured outcomes, but this is (unfortunately) true of most recent advances in medicine.  It is not often that we have a new intervention with the dramatic success of e.g. insulin for diabetes or surgery for acute appendicitis.  Howick is right to see that the methodology of the RCT is suited for some interventions and not suited for others, but the methodology is, in fact, suited for many if not most of the health care interventions currently in development.
	The approach used by Worrall, Cartwright and Howick is to argue that the RCT is not a necessary or a sufficient method for getting knowledge from clinical trials.  They argue that other methods can be equally or more effective in specific circumstances, and that knowledge from trials always involves projection to untested domains.  What they do is instruct us that EBM is not a general, complete, all purpose and infallible methodology of science.  EBM enthusiasts are beginning to acknowledge this sensible moderation of their views, as the recent Harveian Oration by Sir Michael Rawlins​[8]​ shows (Rawlins 2008, 2152-2161).  In this paper, Rawlins argues that “the notion that evidence can be reliably placed in hierarchies is illusory,” the findings of RCTS should be extrapolated with caution, and that “striking effects can be discerned without the need for RCTs.”
	Granting these qualifications puts EBM in the same category as other successful scientific methodologies.  They are useful tools in the domains in which they work, but they do not work everywhere or always.  There are more questions to ask and more criticisms of EBM to make.  Most importantly, we do not yet know how successful EBM is in practice, in the domains in which its preferred methodologies are appropriate.

B.	Effectiveness of EBM methods in practice
How reliable is EBM in practice?  RCT and meta-analyses generate claims with stated confidence levels.  Typically, RCTs give 95% confidence levels and meta-analyses much higher confidence levels.  It follows that each RCT has a 5% chance of producing a false positive (and each meta-analysis much less).  Yet, in practice, RCTs and meta-analyses are much more fallible.
Ioannidis (2005, 218-228) did a study of 59 highly cited original research studies.  Less than half (44%) were replicated; 16% were contradicted by subsequent studies and 16% found the effect to be smaller than in the original study; the rest were not repeated or challenged.  Another, more well known statistic is that studies funded by pharmaceutical companies—even when properly blinded and of the same highest quality as unfunded studies—have an astonishingly higher chance of showing effectiveness of an intervention than studies not funded by pharmaceutical companies (Lexchin et al. 2003, 1167-1170; Bekelman, Li, and Gross 2003, 454-465; Bero et al. 2007, e184).  And LeLorier et. al. (LeLorier et al. 1997, 536-542) found that 35% of the time, the outcome of RCTs is not predicted accurately by previous meta-analysis.
This is a baffling and largely unexplained failure rate.  Some suggest that factors such as publication bias, time to publication bias and pharmaceutical funding bias are responsible for the worse-than-expected track record of RCTs, systematic reviews and meta-analyses.  Publication bias occurs when studies with null or negative results​[9]​ are not written up or not accepted for publication because they are wrongly thought to be of less scientific significance.  Steps to address this bias have been taken in many areas of medical research by creating trial registries and making the results of all trials public.  Time to publication bias is a more recently discovered phenomenon: trials with null or negative results, even when they are published, take much longer than trials with positive results (6 to 8 years for null or negative results compared with 4 to 5 years for positive results) (Hopewell et al. 2007).  It is possible that steps taken to correct for publication bias will also help correct for time to publication bias.
	The additional bias created by pharmaceutical funding is not fully understood, especially since many of these trials are properly randomized and double-blinded and satisfy rigorous methodological criteria.  Some suggest that pharmaceutical companies deliberately select a weak control arm, for example by selecting a low dose of the standard treatment, giving the new drug a greater chance of relative success.  There can also be biases that enter into the analysis of data.  We have not yet figured out how to eliminate or reduce this source of bias while maintaining funding for clinical trials.
	Since the performance of RCTs is so flawed, it is worth asking the question whether other kinds of clinical trials, further down the evidence hierarchy, perform in a worse way.  This would be expected in the abstract, since the further down the evidence hierarchy, the more possible sources of bias.  Studies by Benson et. al and Concato et. al. (Benson and Hartz 2000, 1878-1886; 2000, 1887-1892) find that many well-designed observational studies produce the same results as RCTs.​[10]​  The matter is controversial, but a recent article by Ian Shrier et. al. strongly argues for the inclusions on observational studies in systematic reviews and meta-analyses (2007, 1203-1209)
This result corroborates the intervention of early AIDS activists, who argued against the imposition of RCTs for AZT on both ethical and epistemic grounds (Epstein 1996).  They argued that such trials are morally objectionable in that they deprive the individuals in the placebo arm of the only hope for a cure.  And they argued that such trials are epistemically unnecessary because there are other ways to discern the effectiveness of anti-retroviral drugs—a claim that, in hindsight, has proved correct as a combination of historical controlled trials and laboratory studies have provided the knowledge about anti-retrovirals in clinical use today.  These days, of course, no-one needs to get a placebo, and RCTs can continue to detect small improvements of protocol without such strenuous moral objections.
Finally, EBM has been asked to evaluate itself.  This would involve showing not merely that a specific EBM intervention improves outcomes, but that more general use of systematic evidence reviews and so forth in clinical decision making results in improved outcomes for patients.  In theory, we would of course expect improved outcomes.  But what matters here is not theory but practice, and no-one has yet designed or carried out a study to test this.(Charlton and Miles 1998, 371-371-374; Cohen, Stavri, and Hersh 2004, 35-35-43)

C.	Criticisms of EBM as a general philosophy of medicine  
Like most paradigms (new ways of knowing) the light shone on the paradigm flatters it and puts everything else into the shadows.  Critics have protested, variously, that EBM overlooks the role of clinical experience, expert judgment, intuition, medical authority, patient goals and values, local health care constraints and the basic medical sciences including the structure of theory and the relations of causation.  This is a long and complex list of intertwined scientific, hermeneutic, political and ethical considerations.  Perhaps the most common complaint, which covers several specific complaints, is that EBM is a scientific approach that overlooks the “art” of medicine.   This complaint is addressed in my chapter on the medical humanities and narrative medicine.
In this chapter, I take a look at the criticism that EBM ignores the basic sciences that guide both research and clinical practice (Charlton and Miles 1998, 371-371-374; Cohen, Stavri, and Hersh 2004, 35-35-43; Tonelli 1998, 1234-1234-1240; Tonelli 1998, 1234-1234-1240; Ashcroft 2004, 131-131-135; Bluhm 2005, 535-535-547; Harari 2001, 724-724-730).  Basic sciences guide research in suggesting hypotheses about disease processes and mechanisms for action of interventions.  Basic sciences guide clinical practice in helping physicians tailor the results of epidemiological studies to the needs of particular patients, who may have unique physiological and pathological conditions.  EBM is scientifically superficial: it measures correlations and can at the most provide evidence for particular causal processes rather than an entire causal nexus.  EBM does not model or theorize about the complete organism, still less the complete organism in its social and environmental context.   In terms of scientific theory, it is thin; what some have called “empiricistic” (Harari 2001, 724-724-730).   Charlton and Miles claim that it is “statistical rather than scientific” (1998, 371-371-374).  Ashcroft writes that EBM is “autonomous of the basic sciences” and “blind to mechanisms of explanation and causation” (2004, p. 134).  Ashcroft regards this as an advantage, rather than a disadvantage, because it means that EBM does not have to worry that our basic theories may be incorrect.  Ashcroft allies himself with Nancy Cartwright’s realism about phenomenal laws and antirealism about deeper laws at this point.  Others, however, see the eschewing of scientific theorizing in favor of discovery of robust statistical correlations as problematic (Harari 2001, 724-724-730; Tonelli 2006, 248-256).
Whatever one’s views about scientific realism, EBM typically depends upon a background of basic science research that develops the interventions and suggests the appropriate protocols.  It is rare for an intervention without physiological rationale to be tested (although this does happen, especially in the areas of complementary and alternative medicine, but in these cases there is typically an alternative rationale, perhaps in the terms of Eastern metaphysics).   Moreover, as discussed above, scientific judgment enters into the design of appropriate randomized controlled trials (choice of control, test population etc).  Of course, many interventions with excellent physiological rationales and good in vitro and in vivo performance fail when tested in human beings.  The basic research is not dispensable, even though it may sometimes be incorrect or incomplete.  Even Nancy Cartwright would agree that we cannot replace physical theory with phenomenal laws alone. 
In the past five years a new approach to medical research has risen to prominence internationally: what is called “translational medicine,” to be achieved by creating research centers, as well as journals, conferences, training programs and so forth.  The NIH has made it a priority in its “Roadmap” in 2004 and started offering Clinical and Translational Science Awards in 2006.   24 Institutes have been created (including the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Pennsylvania PA and the Mayo Clinic) and the NIH hopes to fund 60, at a total cost of $500 million annually.  The European Commission plans to use most of its billion Euro a year budget for the next few years for translational research.  In the UK, the National Institute for Health Research has established 11 centers at a total cost of about 100 million pounds annually.  The idea behind translational medicine is to facilitate greater interaction between basic science research and research in clinical medicine.​[11]​  The buzzwords are “synergize,” “catalyze” and “interdisciplinary.”  The idea is to bring the different researchers and their laboratories into greater physical proximity.  This is an interesting retro-intervention in these days of global electronic communication and global travel.
	From the perspective of the discussion in this chapter, the development of translational medicine or something like it was only a matter of time.  EBM has such high claims to scientific objectivity that it attracted much talent and effort from clinical researchers.  Perhaps the increased focus on epidemiological work eventually made apparent what was left out, namely engagement with substantial physiological and biomolecular theories.  The model of basic science doing the research and clinical researchers testing the products is now perceived as limited; actually, it leaves all the fun and the creativity to the basic researchers, and deprives them of the input of clinical knowledge and observations from the clinical researchers.

4.	 Conclusions
EBM is a set of formal techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of clinical interventions.  The techniques are powerful, especially when evaluating interventions that offer incremental advantages to current standards of care, and especially when the determination of success has subjective elements.  For reasons that are not yet fully understood, EBM techniques do not deliver the reliability that is theoretically and statistically expected from them.  Results are compromised by publication bias, time to publication bias, interests of funding organizations and other unknown factors.  Maintaining a strict evidence hierarchy makes little sense when the actual reliability of “gold standard” evidence is so much less than the expected reliability.  I recommend a more instrumental or pragmatic approach to EBM, in which any ranking of evidence is done by reference to the actual, rather than the theoretically expected, reliability of results.
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^1	  The term “evidence-based practice” may be replacing EBM, acknowledging the fact that the practice of medicine requires not only physicians but other health care professionals.
^2	  Some canonical definitions are unhelpful, for example, that given in (Sackett et al. 1996, 71-72): “Evidence-based medicine is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients.”  This particular definition is probably used widely because it is brief, and because it has a rhetorical purpose—to address the frequent criticism of EBM that it applies to populations, not individuals.
^3	  A useful essay discussing the differences and interactions between EBM and MDM is (Elstein 2004, S184-S184-S189)
^4	  They were not, however, claiming along with many Kuhnians that there is subjectivity or relativity involved in what gets to count as evidence.
^5	  There are many such hierarchies in use, but all put double-masked RCTs at the top, or right after meta-analyses of RCTs, and clinical experience, expert consensus and physiological rationale at the bottom.
^6	  Interestingly, Sehon and Stanley (2003) argue that EBM should not be thought of as a Kuhnian paradigm, but, instead, as part of a Quinean holistic network of beliefs.   My focus here is on the historic, rather than the popular meaning of “paradigm” and on what EBM is, not on what it should be.
^7	  Critics of EBM have occasionally presented EBM as a political and rhetorical movement, e.g. (Charlton and Miles 1998, 371-371-374)
^8	  Michael Rawlins is the head of NICE (National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence) in the UK, which bases its policies and guidelines on the results of EBM.
^9	  In this context, a positive trial is one in which the experimental arm of the trial is more effective, a null result is one in which both arms are equally effective, and a negative trial is one in which the control arm is more effective.
^10	  An editorial in the same issue of NEJM (Pocock and Elbourne 2000, 1907-1909)strongly protests these conclusions, partly in the name of EBM orthodoxy, but partly also on the basis of some well known RCTs which contradicted the results of observational trials
^11	  Technically, “translational research” includes both the bench-to-bedside-and-back (T1) and the clinical research to everyday practice (T2) “translational blocks.” See (Woolf 2008, 211-213).  But most of the resources and rhetoric favor the former.
